Report sheds light on regulatory reforms a decade after the global financial crisis
WASHINGTON, November 6, 2019 ¡ª A decade after the global financial crisis, developing countries have increased their minimum capital requirements to help improve the resilience of banking systems. However, countries are still falling short in disclosure of information and supervisory capacity to maintain a well-functioning banking sector, a new World Bank report says.
draws on ten years of data and analysis to show how the dual regulatory pillars of market discipline and capital regulation have evolved since the crisis. New data from the World Bank¡¯s global Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey, a unique database covering regulation and supervision in 160 countries around the world, is available to the public.
In the wake of the crisis, much of the discussion on regulatory reforms has focused on advanced economies, while there is a lack of evidence on the reforms undertaken by developing countries and their impact on the stability and lending behavior of local banking sectors. The report aims to address this knowledge gap and contribute to policy discussions on bank regulation and supervision ¨C the rules of the game and how they are enforced ¨C which are critical for banking systems in all countries to function well.
¡°The right regulatory and supervisory environment is key to creating a financial system that can both attract private capital and align private incentives with the public good,¡± said lead author of the report, Asli Demirg¨¹?-Kunt, World Bank Chief Economist for Europe and Central Asia. ¡°The report shows that one size does not fit all, and less complex regulations may lead to more effective enforcement and better supervision in developing countries.¡±
In low-income countries, the report notes that capital ratios are particularly high, which is an encouraging sign as capital can play an important role in curbing risks and ensuring stability where supervisory capacity is low. More than 60 percent of low-income countries also have an explicit deposit insurance scheme. This means design and implementation will be crucial, since deposit insurance can lead to instability in weak institutional settings. The report emphasizes that regulations need to be designed taking into consideration a country¡¯s institutional environment, supervisory capacity, and business model of banks.
Globally, bank regulations became more complex after the crisis, potentially reducing transparency, increasing regulatory arbitrage and taxing supervisory resources and capacity. The report analyzes two key pillars of regulatory reforms:
Market Discipline can contribute to financial stability, but major flaws were revealed by the financial crisis. Over the last decade, nearly 30 countries introduced legislation to ensure that large financial institutions can be resolved without resorting to taxpayer-funded bailouts in the event of a crisis. Still, large gaps remain. Little progress has been made to improve information disclosure about the health of banks. Deposit insurance schemes have also expanded dramatically. If designed and administered poorly, these arrangements may increase banks¡¯ risk-taking incentives, which can lead to instability, particularly in settings with inadequate supervision.
Capital regulations are also central to managing risk. Data on 20,000 banks in 159 countries reveals that regulatory capital ratios¡ªthe ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets held by a bank¡ªhave improved since the financial crisis. However, this trend has largely been driven by a shift toward asset categories with lower risk weights, which may not adequately reflect real-world risk and could leave the financial sector vulnerable during a crisis.
For more information, please visit: /financialdevelopment
Download the report:
Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey: /en/research/brief/BRSS
Development Research Group: /en/about/unit/unit-dec#4
